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Eyes wide shut? The European Union diplomacy’s stance upon the Syrian unrest 
2011 – 2012 in the context of the Middle East Quartet.  
 
 
Executive summary:  
The article constitutes for a particular undertaking of the author to describe and 
analyse the European Union’s influence over the ongoing conflict – civil war in Syria, 
which outbursted in March 2011 and lasts until nowadays with no clear answers 
regarding the resolution of the conflict. The article analyses the EU’s stance upon the 
Syrian  unrest, taking in the account the actions of the so called ‘Middle East Quartet’ 
– the assembly of the countries (Russia, the United States) and international 
organizations (the United Nation, the European Union) that are involved in 
mediating in the conflicts of the Middle East and that formally established their 
cooperation in the form of the ‘Quartet’ in 2002. The article’s objective is to evaluate 
the level of influence the European Union’s diplomacy exerts regarding the conflict 
by describing and analyzing its actions within the broader background. To this end, 
the actions of all the other Middle East Quartet members are included in the analysis.  
 
Introduction: 
Syria has not been an exception. The anti-governmental riots (so called Arab Spring) 
that swipped away some of the Middle East and Maghreb governments (to mention 
only Tunisia and Egypt) and messed in many other, have not left Syrian citizens 
indifferent. Thus, they too took to the streets, in March 2011, to protest against the al-
Assad regime, demanding his removal from the post of the Syria’s president. The al-
Assad1 family has ruled Syria since over forty years and Syrian people felt fed up of 
the self-feeding government on the wake of the Arab Spring of 2011. Having been 
encouraged by the examples of the other Arab nations, who managed to remove 
their counterproductive country heads, the Syrians have got serious about liberating 
themselves from the regime of the Assad family. The struggle to overthrow the 
government has turned into a full scale civil war.  
The aim of the article is to describe the European Union’s diplomatic efforts 
regarding its stance upon the developments in Syria in the context of the so called 
                                                 
1
 Bashar al-Assad’s, president’s in office father, Hafiz al-Assad, took the chair of Syria’s president in 1971.  
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Middle East Quartet2 and to analyse the EU diplomacy’s influence that it exerts 
regarding the case, using as a reference the comparison with the actions undertaken 
by the other Middle East players, thus the United States, Russia and the United 
Nations. The timing of the developments shown in the article coincides largely with 
an important upgrade of the EU’s foreign action: the creation of the European 
Union’s External Action Service (EEAS) in 2010 (European Union, 2010) as a result of 
the reforms in the EU’s institutional set – up outlined in the Lisbon Treaty (European 
Union, 2007). The EEAS’ creation came just before the outbreak of the 
antigovernmental riots and uprisings in most countries of the Southern and Eastern 
flanks of the Mediterranean Sea.  
*** 
Syria 
Syria’s population is complex. The heterogenic society is a mix of Sunnis, Alawis, 
Shiis, Druze, Ismailis, Greek Orthodox, Maronite and other Christians. The only 
ethnonational identity other than Arab is Kurdish (6-8 % of population maximum). 
Thus, as it would seem to many people, Syria is no simple Sunni – Alawi divide 
(President Bahar Al-Assad is an Alawi). There is a sizeable segment of the Syrian 
society that has lent unintended support to the regime. But even the regime 
supporters admit that since 2012 there is an ever bigger expansion of the instability 
areas and even more decline in the regime’s ability to guarantee stability. There are 
now parts of the country, that are outside the influence or authority of the regime 
(such as Idlib, Dara, Northeast). The regime has been massing its forces in troubled 
metropolitan areas (like Homs) and in the two largest cities, Damascus and Aleppo, 
which for a long time enjoyed a modicum of normalcy3, but finally were attacked too 
by the regime air strikes. What is happening now in Syria is unprecedented for its 
regime, as until March 2011 it was able to maintain domestic peace through social 
alliances and fear of reprisal. Today the situation seems to have changed completely 
and the regime is unable to implement policies beyond its constrained zone of 
influence. The regime is gradually losing its capacity to exercise effective control over 
the institutions, associations and alliances that it was able to manage through a 
combination of coercion and accommodation4.  
The regime’s main opposition is the so called Syrian National Council (SNC), which 
formed a government – resembling body and has its siege in Turkey. However, the 
SNC remains divided, even though it claims to speak for the entire opposition. It 
                                                 
2
 The Middle East Quartet is a foursome of nations and international and supranational entities involved in the 
Middle East affairs and comprises: the United States, Russia, the European Union and the United Nations. Tony 
Blair is the Quartet’s current special envoi to the Middle East. The group was established in Madrid in 2002.  
3
 B. Haddad: “Syria’s stalemate: the limits of regime resilience”, in: “Middle East Policy”, vol. 19, no. 1, Spring 
2012. 
4
 Ibidem.  
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struggles to contain divisions within its own ranks, as well as to unite with 
competing opposition partners5.  
Another resistance compound that found its place in Turkey is the Free Syrian Army 
(FSA), which aspires to oppose the Syrian military in spite of its limited resources. 
The head of FSA is Colonel Riyadh al-Asaad6. The internal opposition, an amalgam 
of what is called the National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change 
(NCCDC), local groups and increasingly an armed component under the rubric of 
the Free Syrian Army, have been capable of playing substantially with the regime’s 
resilience. Even though in the regime’s rhetorics these groups are defined as “armed 
gangs”, they have managed to shrink the regime’s authority over a recognisable part 
of the country and they remain the most authentic representatives of the uprising. 
The regime has limited resources, so they must be deployed in areas of strategic 
value. 
 
 
The Syrian opposition is cross – sectarian and cross – ideological as well as regionally 
diverse, thus reflecting the country’s social make up. It is not a secret either that the 
organisations are primarily related to the Muslim Brotherhood, which received 
ample financial support from Saudi Arabia and Qatar7. There are also Kurdish 
parties. They do not trust Turkey, which has been sponsoring the SNC, nor do they 
trust Arabs who regard their recognition demands as a prelude to a call for 
independence. In addition to that, there are religious minorities, fearful of the success 
of the Islamic parties. Thus, the Syrian opposition can be grouped regarding two 
dimensions: home – abroad and Islamist – secular. The social and ideological mix-up 
of the opposition groups renders any external policy directed to Syria more difficult, 
as it is extremely hard to navigate in a varied environment and to make such an 
amalgam listen to external call for unity.  
The Syrian regime may be weak, but its opposition is even weaker. Resistance groups 
in the country are organized locally, depend on civilian volunteers as well as 
defectors from the military and take orders from the FSA’s leader, Colonel Asaad. 
The SNC8 would like to be regarded as the representation of the entire Syrian 
opposition, but has been struggling to contain divisions within its own ranks as well 
as to unite with competing opposition partners. The US and the EU recognize the 
SNC as the rightful leader of the opposition and have sought to build up its 
legitimacy and authority, but it is too weak and divided internally to constitute for a 
                                                 
5
 J. Landis: „The Syrian Uprising of 2011: why the Asad regime is likely to survive to 2013”, in: “Middle East 
Policy”, vol. 19, no. 1, Spring 2012. 
6
 Ibidem. 
7
 B. Haddad: “Syria’s stalemate…”  
8
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proper and only representant of the Syrian opposition. It has failed to unite other 
opposition groups who have challenged its leadership9.  
The SNC and the NCCDC differ in opinions. For example, the SNC criticized the 
NCCDC for being willing to negotiate with the regime, for refusing to recognize the 
FSA and for standing against any foreign intervention. The NCCDC has even been 
accused of being Asad’s mukhabarat (secret police). The NCCDC does not stay silent 
about the SNC. It accuses the SNC of betraying Syrians by supporting military action 
that would result in widespread bloodshed. The NCCDC officials say for example, 
that imposing the no-fly zone would require neutralizing the regime’s vast air 
defenses, which would lead to heavy civilian casualties. They argue that foreign 
intervention would result in an “occupation” of Syria similar to the prolonged 
military presence in Iraq after the ouster of Saddam’s Hussein regime in 200310. 
Despite the social unrest in Syria, which at a time of writing this article has lasted for 
over 15 months11, the regime feels strong and confident, because it assumes it has 
managed to control the demonstrations, which is partially true. The regime has, for 
example, developed counter measures, penetrating the opposition though incentives 
and threats, often using blackmail. Therefore, it has partially succeeded, adopting 
violence to limit the scope and movement of protesters, and determine the actual 
location and time of demonstrations. But the regime can not be everywhere at the 
same time and the protesters are numberous enough to mobilize protests whenever 
they see a window of opportunity. But the protests are not enough to override the 
regime. The main illness of the Syrian opposition is the lack of unity and 
fragmentation. In Tunisia and in Egypt the opposition could be leaderless and 
disorganized because their armies turned against their presidents. In Syria the 
military is standing by the president and shooting at the protestors. Actually the 
opposition leaders would like to get foreign powers involved. Already in 2011 the 
SNC issued a statement to international community demanding “international 
protection, the establishment of safe zones and intervention”12. 
 
 
The Middle East Quartet 
After having presented the short summary of the composition of Syrian opposition 
and society as well as outlining how these do not necessarily agree with each other 
and upon the ways to resolve the conflict (they agree, in principle, to overthrowing 
the regime, but differ about the way to do it, whether international intervention 
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 J. Landis: „The Syrian Uprising of 2011…” 
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 Until June, 2012.  
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would be favourable and who would take over the governing of the country 
afterwards), time is now to proceed to the core of the article, which is the analysis of 
the European Union’s diplomacy – the EEAS stance with regard to the conflict, and 
embedding it within the broader background of actions led by the other core Middle 
East players, namely the US, UN and Russia.  
The outside actors, witnesses of the conflict, remain uncertain about the situation. 
They realize they are at risk of making an appalling situation worse. Surely, there is a 
division in the international community about the regime’s perception. The West is 
generally favouring toppling of the regime, whereas Russia is not really sharing the 
same opinion. But even if the West would like the regime change, nobody is really 
willing to undertake a military action, similar to the one of 2011 in Libya. The 
Russian stance upon Syrian uprising is quite different than that of the US, UN and 
the EU and within the EU block countries are divided on the issue of a direct 
intervention in the country. Some of the EU countries are strongly against it, as e.g. 
Cyprus, a country holding the EU Council presidency in the second half of 201213.  
 
Russia 
Russia asserts neutrality but its actions make this claim doubtful. On 4 February 
2012, it vetoed, together with China, the Arab League inspired, Western-backed UN 
Security Council resolution that would have condemned the violence and endorsed 
the proposal for a political transition14. Its reasons were various – notably, Moscow is 
still under the shock of the Libyan precedence15, when another UN resolution 
backing limited intervention was used for regime change. Moreover, Russia dislikes 
Western interventionism, which comes from its general foreign policy and 
aspirations of being a power, if not global, then at least in the former USSR and in the 
territories neighbouring the former Soviet republics. In fact, Russia would like to 
control and influence every country apart maybe for the US and the EU countries, 
that seem to have created a pretty solid block of West – minded countries. Russia 
fears regional instability and worries about Islamists gains in its backyard. Despite 
that, Russia does not really have any viable alternative of its own. Rather, it 
encouraged Assad to “accelerate” the reform process and urged the opposition to 
accept it. As an outcome, the opposition is even more convinced that an armed 
                                                 
13
 Interview with Mr Michalis Koumides, Press Counsellor a the Permanent Representation of Cyprus to the EU, 
Brussels, 26.06.2012.  
14
 R. Spencer: „Russia and China veto UN resolution on Syria”, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/9061622/Russia-and-China-veto-UN-resolution-
on-Syria.html#, The Telegraph, 4.02.2012.  
15
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struggle is the only way forward, and countries such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia have 
pledged their wholehearted support to that effort16. 
Another issue in the Russian politics that certainly does not contribute to peace in the 
Middle East is more technical and concerns its arms exports. As the second world’s 
largest arms exporter, Russia is delivering to the Assad regime the firepower it needs 
to crush one rebels group after another. Russia is in effect becoming an accomplice in 
the Syrian’s regime murder of civilians. Moscow says there is nothing illegal about 
these deliveries. It is right because Russia and China have stopped any UN Security 
Council resolution that could block arms to the Syrian regime. Russian claims that it 
wants to avoid a civil war at all costs fall short of its policy of boosting the muscle of 
the Syrian army17. It is a perfect example how a big power, such as Russia, is able to 
blend its economic and political interests .  
 
The United Nations 
The United Nations, an organization whose main task is supposed to be the 
policeman of the world, is in favour of a negotiated transition. To this end, the 
organization, in cooperation with the Arab League, appointed a joint Special Envoy 
to Syria, Kofi Annan18, who kept his office until August 17,2012, when he was 
replaced but the new Joint Special Representative Lakhdar Brahimi19. He is now 
responsible for rescuing fading prospects for a negotiated transition. Annan’s best 
hope lied in enlisting international, including Russian, support for a plan that 
comprised the transfer of power that preserves the integrity of key state institutions; 
ensures a gradual and thorough overhaul of security services and puts in place a 
process of transitional justice and national reconciliation20. Annan proposed the so-
called six-point plan to end the violence, bring relief, and forge political process to 
address grievances in Syria. The plan has been backed by the UN Security Council, 
and as Annan’s office said, it was also accepted by president’s Bashar al-Assad’s 
regime21.  
Algerian diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi has accepted the position of Joint Special 
Representative of the United Nations and League of Arab States for Syria, replacing 
former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan whose six-point peace plan seems dead. “I 
                                                 
16
 „Now or Never: A Negotiated Transition for Syria”, Middle East Policy Briefing, no. 32, International Crisis 
Group, 5.03.2012.  
17
 R. Boyes: „Moscow is an accomplice to murder”, The Times, 14.06.2012.  
18
 He is former UN Secretary General.  
19
 The United Nations, Department for Political Affairs, 
http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/main/activities_by_region/middle_east/syria, 10.10.2012.  
20
 „Now or Never…”  
21
 „Annan’s six-point plan for Syria”, http://articles.cnn.com/2012-03-27/middleeast/world_meast_syria-annan-
plan_1_syrian-conflict-special-envoy-president-bashar?_s=PM:MIDDLEEAST, CNN, 27.03.2012.  
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might very well fail but we sometimes are lucky and we can get a breakthrough,” 
Brahimi told the BBC in an interview. 
Describing the violence in Syria as “absolutely terrible,” Brahimi said he urgently 
needed to clarify what support the United Nations can give him and said it was too 
soon to say whether Assad should step down.22 
The Annan’s plan addressed the killings, that have until September, after bloody 
August of 2012 consumed around 25,000 people in Syria23 (around 10,000 at the time 
of the Annan’s plan writing) and urged to stop the violence. It called the government 
to respect freedom of association and the right to demonstrate peacefully as legally 
guaranteed. Another point call on Syrians to “commit to stop the fighting and 
achieve urgently an effective United Nations supervised cessation of armed violence 
in all its forms by all parties to protect civilians and stabilize the country”. According 
to the plan, the government also should pull back the concentrated military 
deployments in and around population centers. The plan also mentions the 
government’s cooperation with the UN’s Special Envoy in order to bring a sustained 
cessation of armed violence in all its forms, by all parties, including the opposition, 
with effective UN mediation and supervision24. In spite of the fact that it has been 
already 7 months (at the time of writing of this artice) since the plan was issued and 
agreed, nothing seems to have changed for better,. This leaves room for further 
speculation about the UN’s effectiveness.  
Lakhdar Brahimi, the Annan’s successor in the UN’s – Arab League’s joint 
undertaking for a peaceful resolution of the civil war in Syria, actually got some 
success recently. On October 24,2012, he managed to talk the Syrian government into 
establishing a ceasefire during the four day Muslim holiday Eid al-Adha. Many rebel 
leaders who were contacted by Brahimi also agreed to the truce during the holiday 
                                                 
22
 J. Klein: „The new Syria’s envoy bloody background”, Prontpagemag, http://frontpagemag.com/2012/joseph-
klein/the-new-syria-peace-envoys-bloody-background/, 20.08.2012.  
23
 „Death from the skies”, The Economist, September 15th – 21st, 2012, 
http://www.economist.com/node/21562922.  
24
 Ibidem.  
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starting on October 26. Brahimi believes that if this modest initiative succeeded, a 
longer ceasefire would be built on it, and the launch of a political process for peace25. 
Sadly, the ceasefire did not last long. On Sunday, October 28, the government forces 
pounded the airstrikes on the opposition strongholds in the outskirts of Damascus, 
leaving a temporary truce between President Al-Assad and rebels in shambles. The 
two sides of the conflict accuse each other of violating the conditions of a ceasefire 
called of the religious holiday of Eid al-Aidha. The rebels are supported by the Al 
Quaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri who called on the Syrians to oppose the 
‘murderous, cancerous regime’of Bashar al-Assad26. 
Brahimi has a hard job to do, this is no doubt. If a ceasefire can not last even more 
than two – three days in Syria, this indicated an extremely complicated and tough 
situation. Perhaps is he could persuade Russia to back a transitional plan, the regime 
would be confronted with the choice of either agreeing to negotiate in good faith or 
facing near – total isolation through loss of a key ally. Changing Russia’s approach 
might not be unfeasible. If Brahimi can address the Russian concerns about 
preserving the state apparatus (it seems less important if it has to be under Assad, or 
someone else) and the army, it could be brought on board. Especially, if Moscow can 
be convinced that its current course maximises the risk of chaos, civil war and the 
empowerment of more extreme Islamist forces27.  
In the meantime, the UN has accused Iran of supplying weapons to Syria’s pro-
government forces, while Damascus has accused Qatar and Saudi Arabia of arming 
rebels wanting to topple President al-Assad. The 193-nation General Assembly of 
August 2012 overwhelmingly approved a non-binding resolution, which expressed 
"grave concern" at the escalation of violence in Syria and condemned the U.N. 
Security Council for its failure to take strong action. As Syria spirals deeper into civil 
war, the Security Council has been paralyzed on taking strong action as Russia and 
                                                 
25
 “Syria government agrees Eid ceasefire:Brahimi”, AAJ News, http://www.aaj.tv/2012/10/syria-govt-agrees-
eid-ceasefire-brahimi/, 24.10.2012.  
26
 “Airstrikes, casualties and fingerpointing leave Syrian truce in shambles”, CNN, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2012/10/28/world/meast/syria-civil-war/index.html?hpt=imi_c1, 28.10.2012.  
27
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China have blocked three Western-backed resolutions that criticized Assad and 
threatened sanctions28. 
Kofi Annan, even if no longer in the position of the UN envoy to Syria, still has a lot 
to say about the conflict. Regarding the most important question in the international 
debate over the civil war in Syria – whether to intervene there militarily, as it 
happened in Libya in 2011, or not, Annan underlined recently his discontent and 
disbelief about the outcome of such a move. He warned that the military intervention 
in Syria by the major powers would not work. In the Fareed Zakaria’s ‘GPS’ (a 
political talk show of a prominent and very influential US journalist and opinion 
maker working for the CNN), Annan said that the situation in Syria is more complex 
than in Libya, and that military intervention would only make things worse29 
The Unites States 
The United States’ stance regarding the situation in Syria is not too bold either. Like 
the other Western countries, the US clamour the regime to fall, but are hesitant and 
uncertain about how to make that happen and worried of what it would entail. By 
and large, they have taken refuge in a blend of outrage and ever-tightening 
sanctions. The truth is, neither the US, nor the EU truly enjoy a moral credibility in 
this part of the world. Moreover, the sanctions are nothing more than a remedy of 
choice when nothing else is at hand  and what they mainly do is catalysing an 
economic collapse that turns a socio-political crisis into a comprehensive 
humanitarian one.  
The US’s view on the situation in Syria can be described using the words of Susan 
Rice, the US Ambassador to the UN: “Our aim is not to intensify the violence but to 
reduce it. What we have done is to ratchet up the economic pressure on the Assad 
regime such that the economy is quite fragile now. Arming the opposition or 
implementing the no – fly zone – the kinds of solutions that have been mooted – are 
not only not readily available, but not suited to our objectives, which is why we have 
                                                 
28
 “Ban Ki Moon says Syria arms suppliers spreading mysery”, Reuters, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/04/us-syria-crisis-un-idUSBRE8830VZ20120904, 4.09.2012.  
29
 “Annan: military intervention in Syria won’t work”, CBS News, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-
57536692/annan-military-intervention-in-syria-wont-work/, 20.10.2012.  
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supported Kofi Annan’s peace plan”30. As seen from this summary by the American 
Ambassador, the US is waiting, curious about what will happen, but unwilling to 
intervene in Syrian affairs as it did e.g. in the Libyan case. The reasons for such a 
passive approach of Washington is that the US start to recognise their weaknesses 
and unsuccessfulness in the Middle East. They have recently quitted Iraq without 
glory and soon they will quit Afghanistan leaving it to itself as they have not really 
managed to restrain the Taliban influence in the country and possibly it will spread 
up again once they leave. This all has had an impact on the US policy towards the 
Middle East and now Washington is trying hardly to avoid another military 
adventure that may mess up and destabilise already tumultuous situation in Syria 
more, than improve it. Moreover, the traditional ennemies of the US: Al-Qaida and 
dijihadists have certain influence in there31. The US would probably not like to 
provoke them more. 
So far, the Western governments, thus the EU and the US, have been agreeing that 
direct military intervention, which would almost certainly have to introduce the 
creation of buffer zones, was out of the question. Nevertheless, as the massacres of 
the civilians continue, this view is changing. Officials in Britian, France and the US 
have all said that military intervention “cannot be ruled out” in due course. 
Although Western governments would like to avoid it, calls for intervention, 
especially in Washington, are growing. There are two main arguments against it that 
still prevail. The first is that it would require the endorsement of the UN Security 
Council, which Russia and China still show no sign of giving. The second is that 
Syria with 23 million people, unlike Libya with “only” 7 million, would be a hard nut 
militarily to crack and that the ensuing bloodshed would be on a far bigger scale than 
now. An option to intervene by bypassing the UN Security Council is an action like 
in Slobodan Milosevic’s Serbia in 1999, which would probably annoy Russia just as it 
did back then. But in Syrian case such as step of the Western powers is hardly 
conceivable without the close cooperation and public endorsement of both Turkey 
and the Arab League32. Therefore, void of good ideas, Washington, just as well as the 
EU allies, seem endlessly to be waiting for something to happen – for protests to 
                                                 
30
 10 Questions to Susan Rice, Time, July 2, 2012.  
31
 A. Gresh: „Onde de choc syrienne”, Le Monde Diplomatique, No. 697 – 59 anee, Avril 2012.  
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 „Changing Calculations”, The Economist, June 9 – 15th, 2012.  
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build up as they did in Cairo’s Tahrir Square, for the opposition to unite, for a palace 
coup, or for defections to swell and blow up33.  
The question of the military intervention in Syria has also been put on the table by 
the two presidential candidates in the 2012 US elections  that are to be held in 
November. In the recent electoral debate between the US President Barack Obama 
(the Democrats Party) and the Republican candidate Mitt Romney, the candidates for 
the future presidential chair shared one major agreement and one potential 
difference on Syria. The two agreed that the US should not send its own armed forces 
to intervene in the conflict. However, they slightly disagreed on the need of arming 
the Syrian opposition. Romney expresses the opinion that the US should provide the 
rebels with the arms necessary to defend themselves, but that attention should be 
paid that the arms do not get into the wrong hands. Obama generally does not 
exclude arming the Syrian opposition but  he remarked that the US should make sure 
the arms do not ‘get into the hands of folks who eventually could turn them against 
the US or its allies34’. That showed that Obama is in principle less eager than Romney 
to arm the rebels.   
The European Union 
The thing is now to place the EU’s stance in the context of the other Middle East 
players of the so called Quartet. As noticed above, the EU is a part of the Western 
countries club and shares similar views on the Syrian conflict as the US and the UN 
(or more precisely – UN’s western members). But unfortunately, not much more can 
be said about the EU’s activity and influence in the region and in Syria despite the 
recent upgrade of the EU diplomatic capabilities in the form of the creation of the 
European Union External Action Service (EEAS) in 2010, as a result of the Lisbon 
Treaty reforms35. The EU is a good talker, because the issue is often being raised at 
various European meetings in the European Parliament, Commission and the 
Council. European politicians and officials condemn the Assad’s crush on the 
opposition and killings of its own citizens, but this is pretty much all. The same level 
                                                 
33
 „Now or Never: A Negotiated…” 
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 “Obama and Romney in final push”, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-20038723, 
23.10.2012.  
35
 Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, OJ C115/13, 9.05.2008, http://eur-
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of influence (read: low) used to exist before the EEAS was created, which can lead to 
a certain opinion about its effectiveness. But for a greater picture, a short description 
of the EU’s actions is feasible here.  
Perhaps most important action of the EU diplomacy is sanctioning the Syrian regime. 
So far the EU has issued sanctions against 155 persons and 49 companies and 
institutions that ‘support the regime’, as well as 17 sets of restrictive measures36. The 
sanctions got worse after Syrian forces shot down a Turkish jet in international 
airspace on June 22, 2012. Syria admitted knowing the plane’s origin and even fired 
again on a Turkish rescue plane when it searched the jet’s two downed pilots. 
Ankara seeks support with its NATO partners, calling on Article 4 of the NATO 
Treaty, which states that the parties should consult together if in the opinion of any 
of them, the territorial integrity, independence or security of any of the parties is 
threatened37. The military alliance is compelled by article no 5 of the NATO Treaty to 
defend member states should they come under attack. But Western powers ask for 
patience, explaining that this particular article should not be abused. They do not 
want to flame more the sectarian Syrian conflict38. For the international audience, the 
EU’s sanctions on the Assad’s regime seem to be perhaps the only visible acts of the 
EU’s diplomacy attention towards Syria. The EEAS, a body which has as its head 
Catherine Ashton, the EU’s High Representative (EUHR) for Common Foreign and 
Security Policy, does not seem to be a transformative power. Nevertheless, Ms 
Ashton works on the crisis resolution in the Council of Ministers of the EU – one of 
the EU’s main institutions. Being a CFSP High Representative, she presides, as a 
principle, the EU’s Foreign Affairs Councils39, no matter of the country holding the 
EU Council’s presidency40.  
                                                 
36
 ”The European Union and Syria”, Council of the EU Factsheet, 7.09.2012, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/128379.pdf  
37
 NATO Treaty; accessed on the NATO website: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm, 
28.10.2012.  
38
 „Losing friends, making enemies”, Time, July 9,2012.; „Unijni ministrowie potepili Syrię za zestrzelenie 
tureckiego myśliwca, tymczasem Damaszek ostrzelał kolejny”, http://www.euractiv.pl/polityka-
zagraniczna/artykul/unijni-ministrowie-potpili-syri-za-zestrzelenie-tureckiego-myliwca-tymczasem-damaszek-
ostrzela-kolejny-003749, Euractiv, 26.06.2012. 
39
 Sometimes the Foreign Affairs Council may be presided by the High Representative’s deputy, when e.g. it 
takes place during some important mission of the HR.  
40
 Normally ministers the country holding its half-year presidency in the EU Council preside the other Council 
formations.  (e.g. for regional policy it will be a regional development minister etc.).  
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On 23 April 2012, the EU Council of Ministers (presided by High representative C. 
Ashton) welcomed the unanimous adoption of the UN Security Council resolution 
2042, authorising the deployment of an advance team of up to 30 unarmed military 
observers and of the UN Security Council’s resolution 2043 establishing the UN 
supervision mission in Syria (UNSMIS), to monitor the cessation of armed violence 
and support the work of UN – Arab League joint envoy Koffi Annan and later on 
Lakhdar Brahimi. Furthermore, the EU Foreign Ministers stressed that they strongly 
condemn the widespread violations of human rights by the regime, recalled that all 
the people responsible for that should be held accountable and called upon Syria to 
cease the violence.  
The EU Council’s factsheets reads: “The European Union has responded decisively to 
the violent repression and anti-government protests in Syria, which began in March 
2011. We have called for an end to the appalling and unacceptable violence, the 
withdrawal of the Syrian army from besieged towns and cities, the implementation 
of genuine democratic reforms and a credible, genuine and inclusive national 
dialogue….” The EU froze as well the draft Association Agreement that had been 
negotiated with Syria and suspended bilateral cooperation programmes between the 
EU and Syrian government under the MEDA/European Neighbourhood Policy 
Instrument. The European Investment Bank as well suspended all its loan operations 
and technical assistance to Syria41. What is seen there is that the EU can talk, 
definitely, it can freeze the assets and agreements, but its influence remains low as 
the conflicts escalates instead of being calmed down, arms are smuggled to Syria on a 
‘business as usual’ model and the situation on the ground there is a full-scale civil 
war. For the people fighting for their ideas it does not change much if the Association 
Agreement is paused from being negotiated, or if the cooperation programmes are 
working or not, this is not important for them when the war over the control of the 
country is going on.  
To give another example of the EU actions, they are not always directly linked to the 
EEAS, but the officials of the service take part in various meetings in other EU 
institutions and beyond. Such a meeting was held e.g. in the European Parliament 
(EP) on June 19, 2012. During the Committee of Foreign Affairs sitting in the EP, the 
                                                 
41
 ”The European Union and Syria”…  
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representatives of the Syrian opposition Haitham al-Maleh and Kamal al-Labwani 
gave their speeches on the state of the affairs in Syria and pledged the EU to do its 
best to help topple down the regime. Mr al-Labwani stated that the fall of the regime 
is a prerequisite for any change and for starting the implementation of the Annan’s 
plan. He added that a stronger pressure from the international community would 
force al-Assad to leave and thus enable any social negotiations in the country.  Mr al-
Maleh was even more convinced as he said that the Assad’s regime is practically 
finished already and becomes a history just like the Soviet regime became 20 years 
ago and due to similar reasons: the inner burning out and general deprivation. Both 
men urged the EU and wider international like minded countries to pressure Russia 
more in order to make it stop vetoing the UNSC sanctions. The European deputies 
called on the Syrian opposition to unite, as this would facilitate a peaceful transition 
in the country42.  
The other EU’s actions regarding the Syrian crisis are the European Council’s 
statements, statements of the EU Council of Ministers on Foreign Affairs and the EP 
resolutions, such as the one of 16.02.201243. But this is basically all that the EU has 
done so far. As seen, more, but still not actively enough, has been happening in other 
EU bodies, than the EEAS has been doing itself. The EU in general keeps similar 
stance with the UN and the US. But it rests in the shadow of the other actors and the 
diplomatic upgrade of creation of the EEAS has not yet changed much in this regard. 
The social unrest that has been affecting Syria Since March 15, 2011, will likely have a 
lasting effect on both state – society relations and the country’s future development 
trajectory44. Nevertheless, it is doubtful if the EU diplomatic service will be 
mentioned here as a real transformative force in Syria, or wider Middle East.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
42
 ‘MEPs call on Syrian opposition to unite’, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/pressroom/content/20120614IPR46888/html/MEPs-call-on-Syrian-
opposition-to-unite-in-preparing-for-post-Assad-regime, Europarlament, 19.06.2012.  
43
 The Europarlament resolution of 16.02.2012 on the situation in Syria: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2012-
0057+0+DOC+XML+V0//PL.  
44
 B. Haddad:”The Political Economy of Syria: realities and challenges”, in:”Middle East Policy”, vol. 28, no. 2, 
Summer 2011.  
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